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BEYOND NATIONS
Rethinking the history of Habsburg Central Europe

COURTESY THE AUTHOR AND THE ÖSTERREICHISCHE NATIONALBIBLIOTHEK; SOURCE: FLUGBLÄTTER FÜR DEUTSCHÖSTERREICHS RECHT, WIEN, VERLAG ALFRED HÖLDER, 1919

By Pieter Judson

Deu chil terrelch

DEUTSCHÖSTERREICH SPRACHGRENZE MAP BASED ON THE 1910 CENSUS

S

ince t he Ba lk an Wa rs of a century ago, historians, journalists, and
policy makers in Europe and the US
have repeatedly interpreted nationalist
political claims and nationalist conflicts in
terms largely devised by nationalists themselves. In allowing nationalists to shape our
understanding of both historical and contemporary conflicts, we unwittingly follow

a logic that – taken to extremes – demands
both physical separation and independent
statehood for ethnically defined national
populations. This logic rests on claims that
social life is normally organized by communities of descent, defined according to
factors as diverse as race, culture, religion,
language, or some vaguely defined ethnicity. If we wish to prevent violence from

breaking out among neighboring peoples,
this logic demands that political power be
organized on the basis of separation.
Within Europe, the classic locus for the
problem of conflict among nations has
traditionally been understood to be Central
and Eastern Europe. And indeed one could
argue that in the twentieth century, much
blood appeared to be shed for nationalist
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reasons especially, if not exclusively, in the
Only recently have historians paid much
events in history that did not fit this (triumBalkans and Eastern Europe. Many observattention to the kinds of indifference to
phalist and totalizing) explanation – along
ers argued that this was due to a mosaic-like with the evidence they left for alternate
national identification observed by Robert
distribution of different linguistic usage or
Scheu.2 For a long time, such attitudes
understandings of their world – are renhad remained largely illegible to scholars,
religious practice across the region, makdered invisible or marginal by this view.
thanks to the normative nationalist lens
ing national communities incapable of easy
For a small example of an alternate way
through which most of us viewed the histerritorial separation. Of course, the conto understand the region’s history, let me
tory of Central and Eastern Europe. For
cept of an East particularly troubled by ethreturn to one of the premier sites of the
Scheu and his contemporaries, the discovnic conflict tends to forget the nationalist
nationality conflict in Austria-Hungary:
ery of these attitudes posed no problem to
violence that continues to plague Western
to Bohemia. Here, Czech and German
their own belief that Bohemians belonged
European societies as well. Still, for a hunnationalists had battled each other in city
to distinctive, ethnically defined nations.
dred years now, in Europe as a whole, policy halls, in legislative chambers, and often in
They attributed them to ignorance born of
makers’ focus on national difference as
the streets, since 1848. Their organizations
rural backwardness. When they did comthe basis of social conflict makes territorial
mobilized thousands of Bohemians for
separation – even population transfer –
ment on these non-national people, it was
one side or another. This Czech-German
appear to be legitimate and even effective
national conflict became particularly notori- as “pre-modern people” whose internal
policies for containing nationalist conflict.
ous in 1938–39 when, with the help of Adolf nationalist feelings had yet to be awakened.
I am a historian, and certainly not a
A modern education system, service in a
Hitler, it led to the complete destruction
policy maker. I see how the weight of histo...........................................................................................................................................................................
ries that constantly reaffirm the reality and
SEVERAL OF THESE TESTIMONIES ARE PARTICULARLY STRIKING IN
centrality of nationhood in East Central
THEIR SPEAKERS’ APPARENT REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE SUBSTANTIAL
Europe repeatedly encourage policy makers
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN CZECH AND GERMAN BOHEMIANS.
to treat ethnic separation as a viable solu...........................................................................................................................................................................
tion to ethnic conflict. By repeatedly telling
the history of the region in terms that tacitnational military, and greater involvement
of Czechoslovakia. During the very last
ly endorse the views of nationalist activists,
in the growing interregional economy
weeks of the Monarchy’s existence, in July
however we may deplore those activists, we
would no doubt awaken national feelings
1918, journalist Robert Scheu set out from
privilege policies that tacitly legitimate the
in even the most isolated and ignorant
Vienna to visit Southern Bohemia. His
very separation of people that we allegedly
individual. And indeed, the history of the
object, he later wrote, was to “experience
deplore. More importantly, our reliance on
next decades appeared to bear out this prethe national question in Bohemia as a tournationalist narratives diminishes our abilidiction, as nationalist differences became
ist.” In particular, Scheu wanted to know
ty to consider other possible interpretations “how the national struggle manifests itself
even more strongly etched in local society
of the character and dynamics of these
in Bohemia and throughout East Central
in the life of the individual, what concrete
conflicts. And it minimizes the experiences contents stand behind the [nationalist] sloEurope.
of those linguistically or religiously mixed
If we examine more closely what Scheu’s
gans, and what effects the struggle has had
[on society].” 1 By 1918, of course, much had
regions that have not exploded in violent
respondents told him about their relationalready been written on almost every possocial conflict. With that in mind, I have
ship to nationality, however, two related
sible aspect of national conflict in Austriaembarked on a project to write a history
problems become immediately apparent
Hungary, especially in Bohemia. Scheu nev- with historians’ approach to the history
of Habsburg Central Europe that does not
ertheless believed that as a German-speaker of national conflict in Habsburg Central
organize the region’s history around a concept of ethnic nationhood. Instead, I seek to from Vienna, he did not adequately underEurope. The first problem is our too-ready
stand the human dimension of the national- conflation of language use with national
make visible alternative elements of social
ity struggle between Czechs and Germans
organization in the Habsburg Monarchy
self-identification. Should we necessarily
in Bohemia. He hoped to discover how this
that did not rely on ideas of national comcategorize Czech speakers as Czech nationconflict played itself out in the emotions and als or German speakers as German nationmunity for their coherence.
actions of everyday Bohemians, not simply
Thanks largely to the national organials? The second issue that Scheu’s evidence
political activists. What ended up distinzation of European societies today, most
can help us to elucidate more critically is
guishing Scheu’s trip, however, was less
historians of Habsburg Central Europe
the presumption that national identificawhat he concluded about national conflict
still begin their story with ethnic nations
tion or loyalty is somehow a fixed and ongoin Bohemia, than the actual evidence he
as the fundamental building blocks of the
ing quality in people.
collected from rural interlocutors in ethniregion’s history. Many write as if unified
cally-mixed villages of Southern Bohemia.
national subjects were the region’s priLanguage Use = Nation?
Several of these testimonies are particumary actors throughout its history, using
ince t he e a rly nine t een t h
larly striking in their speakers’ apparent
phrases we have all encountered, such as
century both nationalist activists and
refusal to recognize substantial distinctions
“the Czechs demanded autonomy,” or “the
historians in East Central Europe
between Czech and German Bohemians.
Hungarians sought independence.” The
Repeatedly, Scheu encountered respondents generally defined national communities in
collapse of the Empire in 1918 represents
terms of language use. 3 Older concepts of
who either did not think they belonged to
the inevitable telos or goal toward which
nationhood had rested on distinctions of
one of Bohemia’s two nations, or who saw
all of these separate national histories
class or privilege – the nobility represented
no problem with belonging to both.
were moving. The people, institutions, and

S
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in the Hungarian diet, for example, had
traditionally constituted the “Hungarian
nation.” Differences in language use provided an easily recognizable form of difference that could be applied universally to
larger populations. According to nationalist
activists, the Habsburg dynasty ruled over
several different slumbering nations. Not
until a determined minority of “national
awakeners” had come on the scene, aided
by rising literacy rates and new mass media,
did members of these various linguistic
nations begin to awaken to their true identity. As they did, written and spoken language use increasingly became understood
as identity markers rather than as a neutral
characteristic.
The modernizing Habsburg state unwittingly did its own part to help produce this
concept of community or nationhood, by
ensuring that educational, administrative, and judicial practices took account of
regional language use. Already in the 1750s
the state saw the value in offering primary
education in local vernacular languages.
Quite separately from the rise of nationalist
ideologies, language use in the Habsburg
Monarchy gradually became linked to an
emerging concept of citizenship. As the
possibility of gaining primary education in
the vernacular increasingly became viewed
as a right of citizenship, more and more
“language-activists” made broad political
claims on the state regarding language
use in other areas of administration. This
creation of legal and administrative spaces,
where the right to use different languages
in public life was guaranteed, in turn
helped to encourage a new concept of group
identity based on shared language use.
Thus this particular idea of nationhood
based on language use was partially a product of the unique laws and administrative
practices of the Habsburg Monarchy.
The definition of nationhood according to language use was not as commonsensical as one might today think. In the
nineteenth century it often made for some
strange bedfellows. After all, it implied that
local German speakers from Bohemia in
the West, for example, shared far more with
German speakers hundreds of miles away
in Eastern Bukovina than they did with
their own neighbors who spoke Czech. The
same logic claimed that Bohemian Czech
speakers had more in common with faroff Slovaks in Hungary than they did with
their German-speaking neighbors . 4 The
challenge to nationalist activism throughout the nineteenth century was to persuade

people to imagine their place in a larger
national community whose boundaries
transcended those of their rural villages or
towns. People were willing to see language
use as an issue of fairness in their town.
They were less willing to imagine that this
local question might have Empire-wide
ramifications.
Making use of a dizzying variety of
strategies, hundreds and later thousands of
activists sought to bring the abstract idea
of nationhood to literate people at every
level of society, and to make it real for them.
In the nineteenth century it was often
historians, not surprisingly, who were at
the forefront of this work, reorganizing
essentially regional histories into nationalist narratives. Some, like Czech nationalist
Frantisek Palacky, became important leaders in their political movements. (Ironically,
through their work, these men managed to
place the concept of nation outside of history by arguing that it had always been present since the very dawn of time.)
When they looked back to this earlier
period of nationalization, historians in
the twentieth century recognized the constructed nature of national communities
and of nationalist claims. Many rejected
the ahistoric claim that nations had always

THE DEFINITION OF NATIONHOOD
ACCORDING TO LANGUAGE USE
WAS NOT AS COMMONSENSICAL
AS ONE MIGHT TODAY THINK.
IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
IT OFTEN MADE FOR SOME
STRANGE BEDFELLOWS.
existed, awaiting their awakening in the
modern world. But when it came to explaining just how nations had been constructed
in the nineteenth century, historians often
fell back on time-honored nationalist teleologies. When people “became national” in
Bohemia, for example, it seemed a matter
of common sense that those who spoke
Czech had joined a Czech national community while those who spoke German had
joined a German national community.
Much evidence – some of which Scheu
himself unwittingly collected – demonstrates that factors other than language also
determined which national community
people joined . 5 In his game-changing
study of the German linguistic minority
in Prague, for example, Gary Cohen theorized that it was the presence or absence of

neighborhood social networks in a given
language that had determined which
national community people of the lowest
social classes joined. Cohen used Prague
census data to trace changes in neighborhood language use over time, finding that
where no social networks served Germanspeaking working-class migrants to the city,
they soon adopted the Czech language and
joined a Czech-national social life. Cohen’s
study posed a challenge to the normative
presumption that prior language use had
determined later national commitment.
And if factors other than language use
influenced people’s choice to join a national
community, then the rise of popular nationalism in Habsburg Central Europe was far
more a consequence of contingency, or of
individual efforts, than a reflection of the
prior existence of nations. In other words,
the nationalist, as historians increasingly
argue today, preceded the nation.
Following the nationalist lead, when
historians thought about language use
they rarely treated it as a functional choice,
preferring to see in it an identity choice. In
other words, where evidence might have
suggested that Bohemians’ language use
depended on social or economic opportunity, historians read these choices more
in nationalist terms. When Scheu and
his contemporaries observed that some
Bohemians were uncommitted to nationalism, or sought a bilingual education
for their children, they interpreted this
behavior as a rejection of modernity. Today,
however, some historians argue that in
fact the opposite was the case. Thanks to
modernization – to new transport and communications infrastructure, and to greater
literacy – some Bohemians believed that
bilingualism made good economic sense,
especially in a time of significant regional
labor migration. Their hesitation to commit
themselves to a single national community
may ultimately have been a product of
economic and social modernization rather
than a sign of backwardness or ignorance.
Nationalist Feeling:
Fixed or Situational?

B

y t he 1890s, the rise of nationalist radicalism in politics had spilled
over from the legislatures and courts
of Austria-Hungary into the streets and
public squares. The extent of such theatrical and public demonstrations led some
contemporaries to fear for the very survival
of the monarchy. How could a state encom-
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passing so many quarreling nationalities
continue to exist in this age of nationhood?
It also led many later historians to consider
the monarchy’s collapse as inevitable. Here
again our tendency to normalize a nationalist lens makes us equate specific political
conflicts with popular feeling. Nationalist
activists, we think, must have reflected the
broadly based anger of their constituents.
This view, however, renders some other
important dynamics in the political culture
of the monarchy invisible.
The first of these was the increasingly
active role taken by the dynasty to promote
the concept of a multilingual society, in
which diverse cultural groups developed
their own identities and all shared loyalty
to the emperor. 6 Nationalist political parties may have fought each other vigorously
in parliament, in the provincial legislatures, or in town councils, but what is less
well known is how they also competed

as a reflection of an ongoing popular commitment to national communities. Several
local incidents of violence reported in the
nationalist press around 1900 in Bohemia
turn out, upon closer inspection, to have
been protests against the early closing of
a pub or anger based on rumors of harm
done to others.
Following the recent lead of sociologist
Rogers Brubaker, several scholars have
begun investigating the particular historical situations that produced bursts of
popular nationalist commitment, rather
than investigating the nation itself as a
source for such outbursts. 7 According to
this approach, the problem of violence
is not due to the proximity of different
national communities to each other, but
rather to the ways in which people interpret
their interests in specific situations. Some
situations of nationalist conflict may be
produced by people’s perception of a direct

...........................................................................................................................................................................
DEMONSTRATIONS DID NOT REFLECT THE EXISTENCE OF
A BROAD-BASED NATIONAL COMMUNITY BUT RATHER A MOMENT
IN WHICH SUCH COMMUNITY WAS BRIEFLY FORGED.

...........................................................................................................................................................................
publicly to profess their loyalty to the
dynasty. Nationalist movements certainly
demanded changes to the balance of political power or even to the constitution, but
they did not seek the state’s destruction.
The retrospective assertion after 1918, that
nationalists had somehow sought to bring
down the state, completely misreads nationalism’s function and character in Austrian
society. Yet another less-noticed dynamic
of Habsburg political culture was the frequent ability of nationalist enemies to join
together in political compromise behind
closed doors for the benefit of both parties.
Not every situation was open to such compromise, but many were.
And despite the powerful image of
nationalist radicalism in the streets, we
should nevertheless understand the performative and situational nature of this
activism. Demonstrations created national
community by mobilizing a crowd of
people. Demonstrations did not reflect the
existence of a broad-based national community but rather a moment in which such
community was briefly forged. When demonstrations produced violent outcomes, the
violence did not reflect the impossibility of
coexistence among real national communities, but rather anger provoked by a particular situation. I am not even convinced that
such violence should necessarily be read

threat to their personal interests or safety.
In other situations, however, nationalist
feeling may be completely irrelevant to the
very same people. Using such a situational
approach helps to explain why Robert
Scheu encountered examples of indifference to nationhood in the summer of 1918
among a population that at other times had
demonstrated strong nationalist commitments. The nation, according to this theory,
is not a real or ongoing entity, but at best a
situational community.
From Choice to Ascription:
The Real Change After 1918

O

nly a f t er t he coll a pse of
the Habsburg Monarchy, and its
replacement with several self-styled
nation states, did the nationalist versions of
history I have outlined here became truly
normative. Their most compelling claim
to legitimacy in the 1920s rested on their
assertion to speak for the totality of the
people. Politicians, historians, nationalist
activists, and of course negotiators at the
Paris peace settlements of 1919 all claimed
that nationhood constituted a deep expression of popular democratic longings. An
international system based on democratic
principles of self-determination, they
argued, demanded the creation of nation

states. Even the defeated states (Germany,
the new German-Austrian Republic, and
the Kingdom of Hungary) argued for
national self-determination in their efforts
to revise the settlements. No one except for
a handful of literary figures or purveyors of
royalist nostalgia argued for a return to the
a-national principles that had structured
Imperial Austria.
The presumption that nationalist policy
somehow reflected the will of the people
privileged the group over the individual in
legal and administrative practice. Thus, in
a flurry of restrictive decrees, several states
ascribed ethnic nationality to their inhabitants in ways that gave individuals no power
to choose an ethnic or national identity for
themselves. In Yugoslavia, for example, you
could not claim minority status as a German
unless your name was in fact German. In
Czechoslovakia, you faced fines or a jail sentence if you claimed minority status on the
census and officials believed that you were
objectively a member of the Czech nation.
Those people who might have rejected
national identity or adopted several – as had
some of Scheu’s respondents in the summer
of 1918 – were out of luck. Legally they could
only belong to a single nation.
Still others suffered greater injustices. Many Austrian Jews from Galicia
or Bukovina discovered after 1918 that no
nation would accept their professions of
membership, leaving them excluded altogether from the benefits of national state
citizenship or minority protection. National
self-determination left no space for individual self-determination. As Hannah Arendt
pointed out many years later, the rush to
frame individual rights in national terms
after 1918 meant that those who found
themselves without a nation could assert
no credible claim to human rights. 8
Conclusion

S

ince t he fa ll of communism,
historians in many of the Habsburg
successor states have not shaken
off a vision of history based on narratives
of distinctive nations throughout the
centuries. If anything, their emergence
from communism has produced an even
more extreme nationalist historiography.
These historians approach the Habsburg
Empire emphasizing the separate histories
and accomplishments of the particular
nations they represent today, rather than
the common political, administrative, and
cultural institutions that together shaped
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the experiences of citizens of the Empire in
the period 1770–1918. Historical examples
of cross-language cooperation, whether
in daily life or in politics, remain denied,
unexplored, or consigned to a category of
exceptionalism.
When historians, journalists, and policy
makers in the US and Europe fail to interrogate nationalists’ easy claims to democratic
and popular legitimacy, it produces policy
that fails to comprehend the deeper dynamics of a situation. In the case of the former
Yugoslavia, for example, we unintentionally
validated many of the radicals’ worst claims
by supporting solutions – however reluctantly – that separated neighbors – all of
whom spoke the same language – for their
own good. In this context, extremist nationalist politicians on all sides succeeded in
creating radicalized and highly situational
national communities by creatively using
all of the standard media tools at their
disposal. In doing so, these leaders did not
actually reflect or even embody the ongoing needs or desires of their national communities, as they claimed. Instead, they
pieced together several fearful elements of
twentieth-century history at a time of social

instability to construct those communities
persuasively in new and more radical ways
for their political ends.
In the twenty-first century the importance of nationalist politics, their emotional
attractiveness, and even many peoples’
commitment to them are undeniable. Yet
should we still follow the lead of nationalists by narrating the history of this region
on their terms? In the context of Habsburg
Central Europe it is clear that once nations
become the subject of a history, it becomes
impossible to evaluate the influence of
shared institutions and common cultural
practices on the peoples of the region, in
their own terms. A large part of the history
of Habsburg Central Europe thus remains
invisible to us. My own attempts to tell
this story may end with a Europe divided
among nations and nation states, but it will
certainly not start there.
Pieter Judson is the Isaac H. Clothier
Professor of History & International
Relations at Swarthmore College
and was the spring 2011 Nina Maria
Gorrissen Fellow at the American
Academy.
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